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n their article “Collaboration between Public Health and
Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for
Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” Butler et al. present a
valuable introduction to the practical problems of coordinating
public health and criminal law investigations (1). While this
problem is not new in public health, the events of September
11, 2001, have given it a special urgency. This commentary
outlines the constitutional constraints on such collaborations,
with the objective of helping public health and law-enforce-
ment personnel resolve issues that are not addressed by the
article.
Constitutional Limitations
The Constitution is the source of all legal authority in the
United States. Written in 1789, the Constitution was shaped by
the events of the time. The weak union of the Articles of Con-
federation made it difficult to wage the Revolutionary War, so
the Constitution provided a strong central government with the
power to wage war and raise revenue directly, without depend-
ing on state legislatures. The abuses of power by English colo-
nial governors led to the Constitution's Bill of Rights, which
strictly limits the state's powers to prosecute and punish indi-
viduals for violating the laws—the criminal law power—and
to seize personal property for governmental use—the takings
power. 
At the same time, the terrible toll exacted on the colonies
by epidemic disease (2) led the drafters to allow the states very
broad powers to abate nuisances and regulate other threats to
the public health. The public health authority is known as the
police powers (3), as in "to police," meaning to clean up. For-
mal law-enforcement departments were formed several years
after the ratification of the Constitution. Originally, these
departments had broader responsibilities than do modern law-
enforcement agencies, including some public health functions,
so calling them police forces was more consistent with their
original function than their current one.
Under the criminal law power, persons who are accused of
crimes 1) may not be subjected to search and seizures without
probable cause; 2) may not be forced to incriminate them-
selves; 3) are entitled to a jury trial; 4) are entitled to legal
counsel if they are indigent; 5) are entitled to have the case
against them proved beyond a reasonable doubt; 6) must be
prosecuted under a law that clearly identifies the forbidden
behavior; and 7) generally have extensive due process rights to
assure that they are not improperly imprisoned. Under the tak-
ings power, persons whose property is being seized for the
public good have the right to a court hearing and to fair market
compensation for the property. In contrast, under the police
power, public health officials 1) may search and seize without
probable-cause warrants; 2) may take enforcement actions
without prior court hearings; 3) are entitled to have courts
defer to their discretion; 4) have great flexibility in crafting
enforcement strategies; and 5) must only prove their cases by a
"more probable than not" standard if the actions are challenged
in court (4).
From the ratification of the Constitution to the present day,
tension has existed between the Bill of Rights and the police
powers. In a key precedent case, a health department seized
and destroyed 47 barrels of contaminated poultry from a cold
storage plant. The owners claimed that they had been denied
due process and just compensation for the value of the prop-
erty. The court ruled that the destruction or regulation of
threats to the public health entitled the owner only to minimal
due process and no compensation (5). Other cases established
that persons who threaten the public health could be quaran-
tined or subjected to other limitations on their liberty without
triggering criminal law due process requirements. Recent
cases have concerned whether land use regulations that pre-
vent construction are an improper taking (6) and whether clos-
ing bathhouses violates the right of free association (7).
From the earliest cases, the courts have recognized that the
public health powers, defined too broadly, would undermine
the Bill of Rights. The courts demand that the state demon-
strate that the action ordered is intended to prevent harm in the
future, not to punish for past actions, and that the action is rea-
sonably related to the public health objective. A gonorrhea
control program that involved the temporary detention of pros-
titutes until they could be examined or treated for gonorrhea
(8) was found constitutional (9) because the detention was not
a punishment and prostitutes were shown to be an important
factor in the spread of gonorrhea in the community (10). A fire
ordinance that applied only to Chinese-owned laundries was
found unconstitutional because it was not rationally related to
preventing fires and was thus an impermissible race law (11).
The courts recognize that there is a continuum between
pure public health laws and criminal laws. The more closely the
action approaches a criminal punishment, the more protection
the individual is entitled to. Thus, mental health commitments, *Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, USA
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which have a public health component but also resemble
imprisonment, require more due process protections than does
a quarantine order, but fewer protections than a criminal prose-
cution. Preventive detention of accused criminals, such as mob-
sters who might kill witnesses, most closely resembles
imprisonment for punishment and must be done with almost
the same level of due process as a prosecution (12).
The United States Supreme Court and other courts that
decide cases based on U.S. Constitutional law give great defer-
ence to state laws dealing with communicable disease control
and sanitation, the key issues in bioterrorism. Historically,
most state courts, construing their own state constitutions,
have allowed public health officials the same latitude and dis-
cretion for disease control and sanitation as the U.S. Constitu-
tion. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, several states revised
their communicable disease control laws or passed special
AIDS laws that greatly restricted the authority of public health
officials. Some of these laws were subsequently revised
because they made it impossible to carry out tuberculosis con-
trol programs, but many might still interfere with a bioterror-
ism investigation. While most states allow food inspectors and
other sanitary inspectors broad powers in theory, many state
laws divide these powers among several agencies, making
prompt and effective investigations almost impossible.
Bioterrorism Investigations
Certain public health functions, such as sexually transmit-
ted diseases (STD) control, have always involved cooperation
with the police. In such situations, public health officials usu-
ally do not pass on information to the police that would result
in the arrest of infected persons for related crimes such as
prostitution. Yet even STD clinics report potential child abuse
and provide information to law enforcement to assist their
investigations. Bioterrorism investigations require close coop-
eration between public health and law enforcement, which
entails some blurring of their usual roles. Public health investi-
gators will function as forensic experts if there is a prosecu-
tion, and law enforcement will try to prevent the further spread
of disease by identifying and arresting the perpetrators. 
Public health officials can respond quickly to an identified
threat and can conduct investigations without the limitations of
probable-cause warrants. Public health officials cannot use
their powers to circumvent the criminal law protections pro-
vided by the Constitution (13). Information gained from public
health investigations that do not meet criminal due process
standards cannot be used in criminal prosecutions, and if such
information is relied on by the police, it may contaminate their
subsequent investigations and render all their evidence inad-
missible.
Information from public health investigations may be used
in criminal investigations if two criteria are met. First, the
information must be collected and processed with a proper
chain of custody so that it can be authenticated by an expert
and admitted into evidence. Since careful handling is also crit-
ical to proper epidemiologic investigations, this standard of
care should be maintained in all investigations. Second, the
evidence must be obtained as part of a legitimate public health
investigation. For example, food samples taken during an
investigation of food poisoning at a picnic could be used in a
subsequent criminal trial if the food was found to be intention-
ally contaminated. In contrast, food inspectors cannot use their
authority to inspect a restaurant kitchen as a pretext for search-
ing the lockers of restaurant employees. If evidence were
found in an employee's locker, a judge would not be likely to
allow it to be admitted in a criminal prosecution of the
employee. To be admissible, a law-enforcement officer would
need to obtain a search warrant from a judge before searching
the lockers. This necessity could delay the search and might
raise public health issues if it was feared that a toxic substance
was leaking from the locker and endangering the public. Such
conflicts between purposes would be much more severe for an
agent such as smallpox, for which decontamination to protect
the public might destroy all evidence at the site.
From the perspective of law enforcement, all investiga-
tions should be done under criminal law standards to ensure
that the perpetrators will be punished at the conclusion of the
investigation. To a great extent this coordination was possible
in the recent anthrax investigations because the event was dis-
covered after the initial exposure and there was no risk of per-
son-to-person spread. In the case of an evolving epidemic of a
more communicable agent, it may be necessary to choose
between protecting the population and collecting evidence that
will be admissible in criminal investigations. Public health and
law-enforcement agencies can minimize this potential conflict
by careful planning, as outlined in Butler et al. (1). In many
states, the public health inspection laws should be harmonized
to assure that a team can be quickly assembled with the author-
ity to conduct all necessary inspections, whether they involve
restaurants, workplaces, food processing plants, or agribusi-
ness enterprises. By clarifying legal authority before an inci-
dent occurs and increasing communication between
government agencies, especially between forensic laboratories
and the public health laboratories, the necessity to choose
between public health and law enforcement can be lessened.
Professor Richards is the Harvey A. Peltier Professor of Law and
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